Wednesday, September 15, 2010

Andy Xie: Just how much vacant housing does China have? (Part 2)

Below is part two of my translation of an excellent article on the Chinese real estate bubble by economist Andy Xie. For those who read Chinese, I have included the original text below the English.

Bubbles with Chinese Characteristics
China's real estate bubble is different from other bubbles in its unprecedented quantity. China does not have a supply shortage. Urban housing can be segmented into two kinds: employer-provided and private housing. The latter has grown with leaps and bounds over the last ten years, reaching 60 million housing units. Of these, about 20 million units are being built by developers. Local government land supply could still accommodate approximately 20 to 30 million additional units. A large amount of employer-provided housing is torn down and redeveloped. Before the most recent surge in development, employer-provided public housing perhaps exceeded 10 billion square meters. The number of houses torn down cannot be very large compared to the amount of newly constructed houses. Otherwise, these public houses would have lost their commercial significance for local governments. Current total housing is perhaps about 9 billion square meters.

Besides standard commercial housing construction, corporate and governmental organizations also construct housing on their own accord, which they then distribute to their employees. Villages have also constructed a large quantity of housing. In areas bordering large cities, this type of housing also impacts housing supply. If suburban farms are reallocated for urban land use, this rural housing would be officially classified as urban housing.

It is difficult to attain reliable figures for total urban housing. Data on per capital housing square meterage is more useful. Development surveys in most cities indicate housing square meterage of about 28 to 30 square meters per person. We do not know how much of the population this survey covers, but this data definitely does not include migrant workers. We also do not know whether this survey counts vacant housing. According to my back-of-the-envelope calculation, total Chinese urban housing is about 17 billion square meters, with room for error of plus or minus 10 percent.

Although this data is not exact, we can still conclude that China absolutely does not suffer from a housing shortage. If we use the Japanese standard, Chinese urban housing today could accommodate everyone in China -- even if the entire rural population moved to the city.

Understanding the quantity of (solely) speculative vacant housing is more important than grasping the total amount of housing. Although the government has not published vacant housing data, I think the vacancy rate for commodity housing is 25 to 30 percent, at least 100 percent more than in a normal housing market. This difference can be viewed as speculative stock (inventory), similar to when people horde brass to sell it once the price rises. The value of this speculative stock could perhaps account for about 15 percent of GDP.

Even more terrifying, a large quantity of speculative stock may form from 2010 to 2011. Recent credit contractions have put pressure on buyers of second and third homes, causing a collapse in national transaction volumes. I learned from a real estate intermediary that most real estate demand has been impacted by recent regulatory efforts to control the bubble, namely speculative housing purchasing. We can assume that from 2010 to 2011, real estate supply will near 15 percent of GDP. With regulatory efforts suppressing overheating in the real estate market, developers will inevitably horde supply as stock. As soon as regulatory controls ease, speculation will stage a comeback. The value of speculative stock could double.

The probability of current regulatory controls easing is great. Banks in some cities have already begun gradually easing credit. Local governments rely on real estate to increase revenue. If transaction volumes continue to decrease, they will fall into fiscal crisis. Many local governments are already debt-ridden. Local government debt more than five times income is widespread. If revenue streams dry up, local governments will go into default. Appreciating this, the central government may ease the strength of regulatory controls. This easing might be kept secret. Although in the short run this change in the government's tune could ease government fiscal problems, once the real estate bubble pops, problems will come one after another.

Besides commodity housing vacancies, other types of housing also have persistently high vacancy rates. Privileged or well-connected households (e.g. suburban farmers and employees of companies that can build on their own) are unbridled by the marketplace and thus will take the lead. As a result, this market segment's vacancy rate is higher than that of commodity real estate. Although this real estate does not complete with the market, it still participates in the rental market competition. These homes represent one part of effective supply. When calculating the market surplus, one must take this vacancy rate into account as well.

China's urban, vacant houses number less than 64.5 million. Still, they will soon reach half the international standard. This is still equivalent to 20 percent of total urban housing, higher than the peak vacancy rate in Taiwan. Moreover, if the regulatory control policy is loosened, vacant housing will exceed 30 percent of total urban housing.

中国特色的泡沫

中国的房产泡沫与其他泡沫的不同之处在于,它有着前所未有的数量,中国不存在供给不足。城市住房大多可分为单位旧房和私人住房。后者在过去十年突飞猛进,达6000万套。其中,约2000万套由开发商在建。地方政府土地储备大约还能再建2000万-3000万套房屋。大量单位公房拆迁后再开发。在最近一轮再开发热潮之前,单位公房量可能超过100亿平方米。相对于新建住房量,拆迁房数量不可能太大,否则,这些公房对地方政府来说就失去了商业意义。现有住房总量可能在90亿平方米左右。

除了普通商品房建设,公司和政府机构也自行建房,分配给员工。农村也建设了大量住房。在毗邻大城市的地区,此类住房影响房产供给。如果郊区农田被重新规划为城市用地,官方分类将过去的农房变为城市住房。

获得城市住房总量的可靠数字实在很难。人均住房面积数据还比较有用。在大部分城市开展的调查显示,平均住房面积为每人28平方米-30平方米。我们不知道这项调查覆盖了多少人口,但是,这些数据肯定不包括农民工。我们不知道这项调查是否将空置房计算在内。我粗略估计了一下,中国城市住房总量约为170亿平方米,误差区间为上下各10%。

尽管数据不精确,但我们仍可断定,中国不存在绝对住房短缺的情况。如果采用日本的标准,中国城市住房足以安置所有的中国人,所有农村人口迁到城市都足够。

掌握投机型(而非其他目的)空房的数量,比掌握住房总体数据重要得多。虽然政府未能公布空房数据,但我认为商品房空房率为25%-30%,比正常市场情况下至少高出100%。这种差异可被视为投机库存,如同有人囤积黄铜,待价而沽。这种投机库存的价值可能占GDP的15%左右。

更可怕的是,2010年-2011年将可能形成大量投机库存。近期信贷收紧,挤压第二套及第三套房购房者,导致全国交易量崩盘。我从房产中介发现,大多数房产需求被纳入调控范围,即投机购房。可以假设,2010年-2011年,房产供给将接近GDP总量的15%。房产政策调控抑制市场过热,开发商势必囤积供给,作为库存。一旦再次放宽调控,投机行为将卷土重来,可能导致投机库存价值翻番。

放松现有调控措施的几率很大。部分城市的银行已经逐步放开信贷。地方政府靠房地产增加收入。如果交易量持续走低,他们将陷入财政危机。许多地方政府本已债台高筑。地方政府负债超过收入五倍很普遍。如果收入来源枯竭,地方政府会拖欠债务。有鉴于此,中央政府可能放松调控力度。调控放松可能秘而不宣。政府改变心意,虽然短期内可缓解政府的财政困难,但是,一旦房产泡沫破灭,问题将接踵而至。

除商品房空置外,其他类别的房产空置率也居高不下。优势群体或关系户(例如,郊区的农民和可以自行建房的公司的雇员)不受市场约束,将占上风。因此,这方市场的闲置率将比商品房市场更高。虽然这些房产不参与市场竞争,但它们却参与租房市场竞争。它们构成有效供给的一部分。计算房产市场过量时,也应考虑它们的闲置率。

即使中国的城市空房少于6450万套,也将达到国际标准的一半。这仍相当于城市住房总量的20%,高于台湾高峰期的闲置率。而且,如果放松房产调控政策,空房量将超过城市住房总量的30%。

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